This thesis presents an analysis of, and enhanced security model for IndexedDB, the persistent HTML5 browser based data store.
This thesis firstly argues that IndexedDB is insecure by design. That is, the design of IndexedDB means that every implementation is vulnerable to attacks such as Cross Site Scripting, and even data from databases that have been deleted may readily be stolen using appropriate software tools. This is demonstrated experimentally on both mobile and desktop browsers. IndexedDB is however capable of very high performance levels.This is demonstrated through the development of a formal performance model.
In the final component of this thesis, we propose and implement security enhancement that corrects the weaknesses in IndexedDB local storage. The enhancement uses multi factor authentication, and so is resistant to Cross Site Scripting attacks. This enhancement is then demonstrated experimentally, showing HTML5 IndexedDb may be securely used both on and offline.
Research Supervisors
- Dr. Jeremy Ellman
- Ms Shelagh Keogh
Key Publications
Some potential issues with the security of HTML5 indexedDB. / Conference paper
Performance Testing and Comparison of Client Side Databases Versus Server Side. / Conference paper
An Investigation into Possible Attacks on HTML5 IndexedDB and their Prevention. / Conference paper
